Bryant University

Bryant Digital Repository
Economics Faculty Journal Articles

Economics Faculty Publications and Research

4-6-2011

Competition for Trophies Triggers Male Generosity
Xiaofei Sophia Pan
Bryant University, xpan@bryant.edu

Daniel E. Houser
George Mason University - ICES, dhouser@gmu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/econ_jou
Part of the Economics Commons, and the Other Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Pan XS, Houser D (2011) Competition for Trophies Triggers Male Generosity. PLoS ONE 6(4): e18050.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0018050

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics Faculty Publications and Research at
Bryant Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Journal Articles by an authorized
administrator of Bryant Digital Repository. For more information, please contact dcommons@bryant.edu.

Competition for Trophies Triggers Male Generosity
Xiaofei Sophia Pan*, Daniel Houser
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, United States of America

Abstract
Background: Cooperation is indispensable in human societies, and much progress has been made towards understanding
human pro-social decisions. Formal incentives, such as punishment, are suggested as potential effective approaches despite
the fact that punishment can crowd out intrinsic motives for cooperation and detrimentally impact efficiency. At the same
time, evolutionary biologists have long recognized that cooperation, especially food sharing, is typically efficiently
organized in groups living on wild foods, even absent formal economic incentives. Despite its evident importance, the
source of this voluntary compliance remains largely uninformed. Drawing on costly signaling theory, and in light of the
widely established competitive nature of males, we hypothesize that unique and displayable rewards (trophies) out of
competition may trigger male generosity in competitive social environments.
Principal Findings: Here, we use a controlled laboratory experiment to show that cooperation is sustained in a generosity
competition with trophy rewards, but breaks down in the same environment with equally valuable but non-unique and
non-displayable rewards. Further, we find that males’ competition for trophies is the driving force behind treatment
differences. In contrast, it appears that female competitiveness is not modulated by trophy rewards.
Significance: Our results suggest new approaches to promoting cooperation in human groups that, unlike punishment
mechanisms, do not sacrifice efficiency. This could have important implications in any domain where voluntary compliance
matters — including relations between spouses, employers and employees, market transactions, and conformity to legal
standards.
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in our experiment under three conditions: the Mug treatment (a unique
and displayable mug); the Ice-cream treatment (Haagen-Dazs ice-cream
bar rewards [see picture S1]) and the Baseline (absent rewards).
Given that systematic differences in the way males and females
value the mug and ice-cream rewards could have confounded
inferences regarding sources of behaviours among treatments, we
addressed this by conducting a standard random-auction Willingness-to-pay (henceforth WTP) elicitation [23] where subjects
received identical information about ice-cream and mug as those
in the ‘public goods’ game (see Methods). We were unable to find
evidence of systematic differences in subjective values between
either males and females or mug and ice-cream (Fig. 1; unless
otherwise noted, all p-values are based on two-tailed MannWhitney tests).
The Ice-cream condition constitutes a powerful control for the
effects of trophies on participants’ decisions. In particular, Ice-cream
is identical to Mug except that the Ice-cream reward is neither
unique nor displayable. Comparing Mug to Ice-cream thus provides
rigorous evidence on how competition for displayable rewards
influences cooperation. Moreover, given that subjects know that
rewards will be distributed privately, our design enables an
investigation of how rewards modulate subjects’ intrinsic desire to
compete [24], [25] (see Methods Summary).
All interactions in the experiment took place anonymously. In
all conditions, fixed groups of four subjects played a game they
knew would last ten periods. Each group member received an

Introduction
Promoting the behaviour of altruists and depressing that of
egoists is vital for cooperation [1], [2]. The axiom of self-interested
behaviour suggests that to accomplish this, one must provide
sufficient individual incentives [3], [4]. Pecuniary incentives are
natural, but in enforcing compliance they can sacrifice intrinsic
altruistic motives and reduce economic efficiency [2], [5]–[14].
Status, a non-pecuniary reward that is potentially efficient, can
also be an effective incentive. For example, evolutionary biologists
have long pointed to status as the reason that human males in
hunter-gatherer societies provide food to their group even absent
direct food reciprocity [15]–[19]. In particular, such contributions
are displays that generate status for the winners of hunting
competitions [19]. In this sense, status emerges as a currency of
reciprocity [11]–[13], [20].
Given that displays can lead to status, and that status improves
males reproductive success [21], it follows that males may compete
for unique displays out of competition [15],[16],[18],[22]. If so, an
intrinsic desire for unique and displayable rewards out of
competition might impact male behaviour in contemporary
competitive environments. This effect could perhaps be used to
promote generosity efficiently in social environments.
We examined how a competition for unique and displayable
(trophy) rewards affects male generosity in a ‘public goods’ game with
real money stakes. A total of 152 subjects (30.8% female) participated
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 1. Willingness-to-pay (WTP) for ICES Mug and Haagen-Dazs Ice-cream. The Fig. describes males’ and females’ WTP for the ICES Mug
(filled black bars), the Haagen-Dazs Ice-cream (open bars), and the differences between them (filled grey bars). WTPs are statistically identical
between males and females for both the mug (z = 1.593, P = 0.111) and the Ice-cream bar (z = 1.418, P = 0.156). WTPs are also statistically identical
within the same gender for the two items (Wilcoxson signed-rank test: for male, z = 0.049, P = 0.961; for female, z = 0.956, P = 0.339, two-tailed). The
differences in WTP for Mug and Ice-cream are also statistically identical between males and females (z = 0.727, P = 0.467).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018050.g001

endowment of 20 Experimental Dollars (henceforth E$, 1 US
$ = 25 E$), and decided how much to contribute to a group
project. All E$s not contributed to the project were transferred to
the subject’s private account. For every 1E$ contributed to the
project, all group members, including those who invested little or
nothing, earned 0.4 E$. Thus, in the Baseline treatment, it was
always in a participant’s material self-interest to invest 0 E$,
regardless of the contributions of the participant’s group members.
In the reward treatments, one had an added incentive to
contribute, but our WTP elicitation (Fig. 1) suggests these
incentives are small and identical between reward treatments
(see SI: Text S1). Note that if every group member chose to keep
her or his endowment privately, then there was nothing to be
shared, whereas if all contributed their entire 20 E$ then every
member earned 0.4680 = 32 E$.
Subjects made their contribution decisions simultaneously.
Afterwards, they were shown the contribution decisions of each of
their (anonymous and non-gender identified) group members.
Decisions were displayed in a random order to avoid reputation
building (see methods summary). Then, subjects were able to assign
approval ratings to each of their group members. All approval
decisions were made simultaneously and subjects were not able to
assign approval to themselves. At the end of each period in the Mug
and Ice-cream conditions, subjects who received the most approval
points won an electronic gold star. In case of ties, all earned a gold
star, so that each subject could receive up to ten stars over ten
periods. Each star increased the chance to win the final reward by
10 percentage points. Thus, a person with zero gold stars at the end
of the game had a zero percent chance to win the award, while a
person with 10 gold stars won the award with probability one.

Higher cooperation in Mug is associated with increased male
competitiveness in relation to Ice-cream. Significantly more males
in Mug (N = 40) won at least one star over ten periods than did
males in Ice-cream (N = 27, z = 2.116, P = 0.034), while females
display no difference between Mug (N = 16) and Ice-cream (N = 21)
(z = 20.813, P = 0.16). Also, males are significantly more competitive than females in Mug. More males (95%) than females (75%)
won at least one star (Fig. 3a, z = 2.166, P = 0.030) in Mug. Also,
more males (55%) than females (25%) won at least five stars
(z = 22.015, P = 0.044). In contrast, we find no evidence of
differences between males (N = 27) and females (N = 21) in Icecream, either for those who have won at least one star (z = 0.692,
P = 0.489), or those who won five stars or more (z = 0.000,
P = 1.000, see Fig. 3b).
These gender differences, as well as male competitive generosity
in Mug, are supported by convergent evidence from a random
(individual) effect GLS regression analysis (with robust standard
errors clustered by group, see, SI: Table S2). We examined how
the contribution of subject i in the current period varied with: 1) i’s
gender; 2) the approval points i received in the previous period; 3)
the average contribution of i’s group members; and 4) period
dummies. The coefficient of male in Mug is 5.657 (z = 2.76,
P = 0.006), and the coefficient of female in Mug is 1.369 (z = 0.62,
P = 0.536). The coefficient of Mug is significantly higher than the
coefficient of female in Mug, (chi2 (1) = 4.41, P = 0.036), the
coefficient of male in Baseline, 0.943 (chi2 (1) = 3.78, P = 0.052),
and the coefficient of male in Ice-cream, 1.175 (chi2 (1) = 2.95,
P = 0.086). This indicates, after controlling for other factors, that
males in Mug voluntarily contribute significantly more than males
or females in all other treatments and our results are robust to
controlling for session effects. A random effect Tobit analysis yields
substantively identical results (see, SI: Table S2).

Results and Discussion
Higher contributions relative to group members led to higher
approval in all treatments (see SI: Table S1). Despite this
similarity, we find that overall contributions are significantly
higher in Mug than in either Ice-cream or Baseline (Fig. 2a).
Moreover, the frequency of full contributions is highest in Mug.
For example, from period 6 to 10, 48.2% of subjects in Mug
contributed their full endowment, while only 29.2% did so in
Baseline and 18.8% in Ice-cream (Fig. 2b).
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org

Discussion
What mechanism underlies the effect of trophies on male
generosity? One possibility is that trophies modulate male beliefs
regarding the probability of seemingly altruistic acts [1] by others.
In particular, males might have expected other males to contribute
more in Mug to compete for the mug reward. Indeed, we find
higher first-period contributions by males in Mug than in Ice-cream
2
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Figure 2. Contributions to the public goods over 10 periods across treatments. Cooperation is highest in Mug both by a) average
contribution or b) frequency of the full contribution. a. The numbers in parentheses indicate mean contribution (over 10 periods) for that treatment.
Contributions are significantly higher in Mug (N = 14 groups) compared to both Ice-cream (N = 12 groups, z = 2.675, P = 0.008) and Baseline (N = 12
groups, z = 21.800, P = 0.072). b. The numbers in parentheses indicate mean frequency (over 10 periods) of full contributions in that treatment. In the
Mug treatment, most subjects contributed their full endowment (54%), significantly more than in both Baseline (35%, N = 12 groups, z = 21.987,
P = 0.047) and Ice-cream (23%, z = 2.734, P = 0.006).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018050.g002

While free-riders’ contributions also increase under trophy
rewards (Table 3), they nevertheless remain low. It is perhaps
surprising that the frequency of full contribution remains high in
Mug through the eighth period , in light of systematic lowcontributors and substantial theoretical and empirical evidence
that free-riding is contagious [1],[2], [26]–[28]. One explanation is
that receiving approval in Mug diminishes co-operators’ negative
emotions [29]. In particular, free-riders can reciprocate by
assigning approval points to co-operators, thereby increasing the
chance that a co-operator will receive the trophy reward. In view
of the arguments noted above, we might expect to observe more
approval assigned in Mug than Ice-cream or Baseline. We might also
expect female free-riders to be especially generous with approval.
Although sample sizes are small, we find that female free-riders
in Mug (N = 4 groups, see SI: Text S3) assigned significantly more
approval than either male free-riders in Ice-cream (N = 4, z = 2.021,
P = 0.043) or female free-riders in Ice-cream (N = 10 groups,
P = 0.048, z = 1.980). Their approval assignment was not significantly different from male free-riders in Mug (N = 9 groups,
P = 0.217, z = 1.234) Moreover, trophy rewards do not modulate
co-operators’ approval decisions. Approval points assigned by
female co-operators in Mug (N = 7) differ neither from female co-

(N = 40 and 27, respectively; z = 3.696, P = 0.000). This is not true
for females (N = 16 and 21, respectively; z = 1.376, P = 0.169).
We also considered whether the effect of trophy rewards varies
with one’s cooperative propensity. In particular, we classified each
subject as either a co-operator or free-rider based on her or his
contribution in relation to group members (see SI: Text S2). The
frequency of male co-operators in Mug (72.5%) is significantly
higher than in Ice-cream (44.4%, z = 2.294, P = 0.022, Table 1), and
similar to Baseline (75%, P = 0.812, z = 0.239). Nevertheless, cooperators’ contributions in Mug (mean = 16.3, N = 12 groups) are
significantly higher than in Baseline (mean = 13.3, N = 11 groups,
P = 0.021, z = 22.309).
The frequency of female co-operators is statistically identical
between treatments (see Table 1). Also, female co-operators’
contributions do not statistically differ between Mug (mean = 15.5,
N = 7 groups) and Baseline (Table 2, mean = 14.7, N = 8 groups,
z = 0.926, P = 0.354). Female co-operators’ contributions are significantly higher in Mug than in Ice-cream (mean = 11.7, N = 9 groups,
z = 1.747, P = 0.081). Females were not typically star-winners in Mug.
This is consistent with the theory that higher female contributions in
Mug are due to males’ initial unconditional generosity combined with
subsequent female cooperation (see SI: Table S2).
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org
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Figure 3. Number of stars won in Mug and Ice-cream treatments. Each panel describes the percent of males and females who won different
numbers of stars (tying allowed) in Mug or Ice-cream. a. Percent of males (filled bars, N = 40) and females (open bars, N = 16) winning 0, 1–4 or 5–10
stars in Mug. Significantly more males than females won at least one star, or at least five stars over 10 periods. b. Percent of males (filled bars, N = 27)
and females (open bars, N = 21) winning 0, 1–4, or 5–10 stars in Ice-cream.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018050.g003

operators in Ice-cream (N = 9, z = 0.053, P = 0.958) nor male cooperators in Ice-cream (N = 10, z = 0.781, P = 0.435) or Mug
(N = 12, z = 0.423, p = 0.673). A random effect GLS regression
analysis provides additional evidence that only the approval
behaviour of female free-riders is modulated by trophy rewards
(see SI: Table S3).

Our results support the view that unique and displayable
rewards promote male generosity and cooperation in a social
dilemma environment through a generosity competition. We
examined behaviour under both Ice-cream and Mug (trophy)
rewards, and found only trophy rewards to promote cooperation.
Our Ice-cream treatment rules out competition per se [30] as an

Table 1. Percent of Cooperators.

Pairwise Comparison between Male

Pairwise Comparison between Female

Mug(N = 40)

Baseline (N = 32)

Ice-cream (N = 27)

Mug (N = 16)

Baseline (N = 16)

Ice-cream (N = 21)

73%

71%

------------

75%

63%

------------

73%**

-------------

44%

75%

-------------

71%

----------

71%**

44%

----------

63%

71%

Level of significance for Table 1–3: *p,0.1, **p,0.05, ***p,0.01.
Numbers of males/females are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018050.t001
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Table 2. Mean Contribution of Cooperators.

Pairwise Comparison between Male

Pairwise Comparison between Female

Mug (N = 12)

Baseline (N = 11)

Ice-cream (N = 10)

Mug (N = 7)

Baseline (N = 8)

Ice-cream (N = 9)

16.3**

13.3

---------------

15.5

13.7

---------------

16.3

------------

12.8

15.5*

------------

11.7

------------

13.3

12.8

---------------

13.7

11.7

Numbers in parentheses are at group level (see Text S3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018050.t002

explanation for increased cooperation, as it is identical to Mug
except that ice-cream reward is neither unique nor displayable.
Further, our WTP comparison between Ice-cream and Mug rules
out explanations for our results that appeal to differences in
subjective values males and females assign to the rewards. We
speculated that the mechanism underlying cooperation with
trophy rewards relies on the combination of two forces: 1) changes
in expectations (especially male expectations) due to the presence
of a unique and displayable reward; and 2) the use of approval by
free-riders (especially female free-riders) as a currency of
reciprocity.
Our results suggest new directions for designing institutions to
promote cooperation efficiently among groups of genetic strangers,
mechanisms that turn on reward rather than sanctions.

distributed the reward (see methods), along with the cash payment,
to each subject privately.
Upon entering the laboratory each subject, was seated in a
carrel separated from other subjects in a way that ensured
anonymity. Participants then received written instructions. After
the experimenter read the instructions aloud, participants were
quizzed to ensure they understood the procedures and the payoff
structure. The experiment did not proceed until each subject
completed the quiz successfully. The ‘public goods’ game was
written using the experimental software Z-tree [31].

How to distribute the rewards
Those who earned stars in Mug and Ice-cream treatments had the
opportunity to draw once from a deck of ten cards, numbered 1
through 10. Subjects would receive the reward if the number they
drew was equal to or smaller than the number of stars they earned
during the experiment.

Methods
A total of 182 students from George Mason University participated
in our experiments. 152 subjects (34.9% female) participated in the
‘public goods’ experiments and an additional 30 subjects (43.3%
female) who had not participated in the ‘public goods’ experiment took
part in the hand-run WTP elicitation [23] (see methods).
A total of thirteen sessions, each with 8–12 subjects, took place
for three different conditions in the ‘public goods’ experiment.
Each subject only participated in one session for one condition.
The experiments lasted 45–50 min and on average subjects earned
$16.00 per session.
In both the Mug and Ice-cream treatment, rewards were briefly
shown by the experimenter to all the subjects together in the room.
In each period, the subjects knew nothing about the history of
contributions of specific group members, thus ruling out
reputation formation. At the end of each period in the reward
treatments, subjects were informed of: 1) the accumulated gold
stars they had earned; 2) the total approval they received; 3) the
highest contribution among gold star winners in their group (if
tied); 4) their own contribution; and 5) their current and
accumulated monetary pay-off. At the end of each period in
Baseline, subjects only know 2), 4) and 5). The experimenter

Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) Elicitation
We recruited 30 students (43.3% female) who had not
participated in the ‘public goods’ experiment to take part in the
WTP elicitation. This experiment adopted the Becker-DeGrootMarschak [23] random auction mechanism to elicit WTP for the
ICES mug and the Haagen-Dazs ice-cream bar. Subjects were
endowed with $10. Prices of the auctioned items ranged from $0 to
$10 in increments of $0.50. The maximum value $10 exceeded their
maximum expected WTP and the minimum $0 was at least equal to
their WTP. Subjects in the WTP experiment were provided with
the same information about the auctioned items as subjects in the
respective rewards treatments of the ‘public goods’ game.

Ethics Statement
All procedures used in the research are in accordance with the
Guidelines for the Use of Human Subjects in Research and have
been approved by the Institutional Review Board of George
Mason University (HSRB protocol #6300). We obtained written
consent form from all participants in our study.

Table 3. Mean Contribution of Free-riders.

Pairwise Comparison between Male
Mug (N = 9)

Baseline (N = 7)

Pairwise Comparison between Female
Ice-cream (N = 10)

Mug (N = 4)

Baseline (N = 4)

Ice-cream (N = 4)

8.7

7.7

---------------

7.7

6.6

---------------

8.7*

---------------

4.4

7.7*

--------------

5.2

--------------

7.7**

4.4

---------------

6.6

5.2

Numbers in parentheses are at group level (see Text S3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0018050.t003
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significantly higher than 0.324, the coefficient for male conditional
cooperation in Mug (chi2 (1) = 6.94, P = 0.008).
(DOCX)

Supporting Information
Table S1 Determinants of Approval Received. Table S1
shows that determinants of approval points received follow a
similar pattern across the treatments. In particular, the greater
(smaller) the contribution in relation to others, the greater (smaller)
was the amount of approval a person received. The strength of this
effect is identical among treatments. This is shown by the
coefficient for ‘‘Treatment variable (Baseline/Mug/Ice-cream)6
Positive/Negative Deviation from Others’ average.’’ Moreover, in
all treatments, the group’s highest contributor is also a star winner
with frequency at least 90%.
(GIF)

Table S3 Allocation of Approval Points.

(DOCX)
Text S1

(DOCX)
Text S2

(DOCX)
Text S3

(DOCX)

Female Conditional Cooperation and Male
Unconditional Generosity. First period contributions between
Mug and Ice-cream are statistically identical among female cooperators (N = 12 for Mug; N = 15 for Ice-cream. z = 1.001,
P = 0.317); within Mug, however, significant differences emerge
between female co-operators’ (mean = 14.0, N = 12) and male cooperators’ in the first period (mean = 17.4, N = 29, z = 22.356,
P = 0.019). Nevertheless, over time in Mug, female co-operators’
(N = 7 groups) contributions increase so that overall average
contributions do not differ between male (N = 12 groups) and
female co-operators (N = 7 groups) (z = 20.466, P = 0.641).
Table 2 provides evidence to support female conditional
cooperation. We see that the coefficient for female conditional
cooperation in Mug is 0.635 (z = 5.72, P = 0.000), which is
Table S2

Picture S1

(PDF)
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